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MAINE TAX REFORM

Issues in Tax Reform in Maine
by Richard Woodbury
Tax reform has been prominent in public policy discussions in Maine for many years. However, there has yet to be
comprehensive reform. Richard Woodbury notes that critics have described Maine’s tax system “as some combination of imbalanced, burdensome, unfair, uncompetitive, complex, archaic, and volatile.” He presents some of the
features of the state’s current tax system and the approaches to reform that have been considered in recent years.
He discusses how alternative approaches to reform might be evaluated and structured to achieve different goals, and
highlights different ways to distribute taxes between residents and nonresidents.

I

n a 2009 study for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
“The Struggle for Tax Reform in Maine, 2003–2009,”
I described the motivations for tax reform in Maine and
reviewed the tax reform initiatives that were considered
over this seven-year period (Woodbury 2009). My aim
in this follow-up paper is to update the tax-related data
from the earlier study, accounting for the tax policy
changes that have been enacted since 2009, and to elaborate on the differential impact of alternative approaches
to reform.
The last major statewide commission on tax reform
completed its work in 2003. Made up of a former
governor, former chief justice, former speaker of the
House, business leaders, tax accountants and economists,
the commission recommended substantial changes to a
system they characterized as outdated.
For the past 20 years, the general public and the private
sector have voiced concerns about the impact of state
and local tax structures on Maine citizens and businesses. While the Maine economy has been undergoing
substantial change from a natural resource based and
manufacturing economy to a service based economy
over the last 25 years, Maine’s tax structure has not
changed significantly since Governor Curtis reformed
it 33 years ago (Speaker’s Advisory Committee on Tax
Reform 2003).

In the decade since their report, tax reform has
remained a prominent topic of policy discussion
and advocacy. Though changes have been made to
aspects of Maine’s tax structure, reforms have been
piecemeal rather than comprehensive. Maine’s tax
system continues to be described by critics as some

combination of imbalanced, burdensome, unfair,
uncompetitive, complex, archaic, and volatile.
Although support for some type of tax reform is
nearly universal in Maine, there is no clear agreement
on what it should entail, or even on the problems tax
reform is designed to fix. To some, the key problem is
the burden of property taxes. To some, it is the total of
all Maine’s taxes that is the problem and its relationship to the size of government. To some, the key issue
is how the system treats lower-income versus higherincome taxpayers—the progressivity (or regressivity) of
taxes (see Johnson, this issue). To some, the key
problem is economic incentives that drive people or
businesses to locate elsewhere. To some, the problem is
too many complicating exemptions, deductions, exclusions, credits, and reimbursements. And to still others,
the problem is revenue volatility and its disruptive
impact on state spending.
In discussing the differential impact of alternative
approaches to tax reform, the distribution of taxes
between residents and nonresidents is among the issues
highlighted in the study presented here. This has
particular relevance for Maine because of the many
nonresidents who spend time in the state. Since some
taxes are imposed on residents only, while others are
collected from both nonresidents and residents, there
are opportunities through tax reform to change that
distribution. Tax relief measures can also be administered in ways that disproportionately benefit residents
over nonresidents.
In the remainder of this paper, I consider issues in
property tax reform, income tax reform, and sales tax
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Figure 1:

Gross Property Tax Burden as Percentage of Income
across Maine Households, 2013

PROPERTY TAX REFORM

40%

P

roperty taxes differ from most other forms
of taxation because they are imposed on an
30%
asset value rather than on a payment stream,
such as income or spending. As a result, property
25%
taxes may represent a small, moderate, large, or
20%
very large fraction of income, depending on the
circumstances of the individual homeowner. The
15%
wide variability in tax burdens across house10%
holds, the very high burden imposed on some
households, and the payment of the tax in large
5%
annual or semiannual billings make property
0%
tax
burdens particularly visible. Figures 1 and
<3%
3–6%
6–10%
10–20%
>20%
2 illustrate the degree to which property tax
Tax Burden (% of Income)
burdens vary across the population, as estimated
Source: Maine Revenue Services estimates, October 2013
by Maine Revenue Services for 2013.
An estimated 38 percent
of resident homeowners pay
Figure 2: Percentage of Households with High Property
less than 3 percent of their
Tax Burden, by Income, 2013
income in property taxes, and
35 percent pay between 3
100%
percent and 6 percent of their
90%
income. Some 28 percent of
households pay more than 6
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percent of their income; 11
70%
percent of households pay
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households pay more than 20
percent of their income. The
40%
proportion of households with
30%
high property tax burdens is
particularly high at lower
20%
income levels, as illustrated by
10%
Figure 2.
Though property taxes are
0%
collected and spent locally,
rather than by the state, there
are several things that the state
can do to relieve property
Income Range
taxes. One is to provide
Source: Maine Revenue Services estimates, October 2013
targeted property tax refunds
to taxpayers who face a particularly high property tax
reform, respectively. Specifically, I examine how alternaburden. These are often referred to as property tax
tive approaches to reform might be evaluated and struccircuit breaker programs. A second is to create a proptured to achieve different goals, such as progressivity,
erty tax exemption, such as the current $10,000
growth, revenue stability, and exportability.
exemption on primary residences in Maine. In Maine,
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such exemptions generally require the state to reimburse municipalities for at least half of their lost revenues from the exemption. A third approach is to
transfer more of the revenues from statewide sources
(primarily income and sales taxes) to local governments
and local school districts, lessening the amount that
needs to be made up through local property taxes.
Each of these approaches has costs to the state. Their
distributional effects differ.
Property Tax Circuit Breakers
Property tax refund programs, or circuit breakers,
are the most narrowly targeted approach to property
tax relief, because the funds allocated to them are
concentrated entirely on resident taxpayers with the
highest individual burden of property taxes. This
includes renters, who qualify by apportioning a certain
percentage of their rent as the “property tax equivalent”
cost of their housing. Some form of circuit breaker
program has been in effect in Maine for decades,
though program modifications have been frequent.
The most significant circuit breaker expansion was
enacted as part of the LD 1 reforms in 2005. The
amount of the refunds has been cut back since 2005,
and the program was replaced by a much smaller
program in 2013. Maximum property tax refunds
reached a peak of $2,000 following LD 1, and are just
$300 (or $400 for those over age 70) now.
In earlier work with Michael Allen (Allen and
Woodbury 2006), we demonstrated the potential for
circuit breaker programs to offset the very high property
tax burdens imposed on some households in Maine.
Specifically, we analyzed the impact of the LD 1 reforms
enacted by the legislature in 2005, including an increase
in the maximum refund to $2,000, expanded eligibility
to middle-income households, and a phasing out of the
benefit at higher income levels. Our study looked at the
proportion of households with a high net burden of
property taxes—first, without circuit breaker benefits;
second, based on the circuit breaker program in effect
before LD 1; and third, based on the reformed program
after LD 1.
The results of our study, reproduced in Figures 3
and 4 and based on data from the early to mid-2000s,
examined the program’s potential tax relief if all eligible
households applied for benefits. We showed dramatic
potential reductions in the proportion of households
with high property tax burdens when using a generous
circuit breaker refund program. The reductions in tax

burden were particularly significant among lowerincome taxpayers, as shown in Figure 4. As a frame of
reference, the cost to state government of the LD 1
circuit breaker program was about $45 million annually
following its enactment in 2005.
Despite a significant scaling back in the circuit
breaker formula for 2014, including much smaller
maximum refunds, the estimated annual cost of the
program is still projected by Maine Revenue Services at
about $35 million annually. There are at least two
reasons for this. One is that the application process for
property tax refunds will be integrated with the filing of
state income tax returns. Formerly, only about half of
households eligible for circuit breaker refunds applied to
receive them. With an integrated and simplified application process, higher participation is projected in the
reformed program. Second, the income measurement
used to determine program eligibility now conforms to
Maine’s definition of adjusted gross income, which
excludes Social Security and other previously counted
income sources. Under the reformed program, more
Social Security beneficiaries in particular are likely to
qualify for property tax refunds.

… circuit breakers are the most
narrowly targeted approach to
property tax relief because [funds]
are concentrated entirely on resident taxpayers with the highest …
burden of property taxes.

Homestead Exemptions
Homestead exemptions, though not means tested,
are another form of property tax relief that targets
Maine residents only. It is available to resident homeowners on their primary residence, but is not available to renters and does not apply to vacation
property. As noted, the current homestead exemption
in Maine exempts the first $10,000 in the value of
one’s principal residence from being taxed. The level
of Maine’s homestead exemption has also been
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Figure 3:

Effect of Circuit Breaker on Percentage of Maine
Households with Higher Property Tax Burden

today’s $10,000 homestead exemption reduces
by just 1 percent the taxable value of a $1
million homestead, but it reduces by 20
percent the taxable value of a $50,000 homestead. Second, the exemption is worth more in
communities that already burden taxpayers
with high property tax rates. In a community
with a high property tax rate, say 25 mils for
example, Maine’s current homestead exemption translates roughly into $250 in property
tax relief. In a community with a low property
tax rate, say 8 mils, the relief would be just
$80. Third, because the homestead exemption
is only partially reimbursed, non-homestead
property owners may pay higher taxes to make
up for lost revenues that are not reimbursed.
Higher taxes will generally be paid on property
owned by nonresidents, commercial property,
and vacation property.
To summarize, the homestead exemption provides more
concentrated property tax relief
to resident homeowners (relative to nonresident and comAfter LD 1
mercial taxpayers), to lowervalued homes (relative to
higher-valued homes), and to
communities with higher tax
rates already.
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Figure 4:

Percentage of Maine Households with Property
Tax Burden above 6 Percent of Income

90%
No Circuit Breaker

Before LD 1

70%
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50%
40%

School Funding and
Municipal Revenue Sharing

30%

Income Range

Source: Allen and Woodbury 2006

adjusted in past reforms, reaching a level of $13,000
following the LD 1 reforms.
There are at least three distributional implications of the homestead exemption. First, it is worth
proportionately more to owners of lower-valued
homes than it is to higher-valued homes. For example,
14

MAINE POLICY REVIEW

Summer/Fall 2013

75K

K

K
$60
K–
$50

–$
50K

$30
K–

K–
$20

$40
K

K
$40

K
$30

K
$20
K–
$10

<$

10K

0%

$75

10%

Transfers from state
revenues to municipalities
and school districts are a
broader form of property tax
relief. The way the schoolfunding formula works, the
state first determines the
total amount that it will
transfer to local school
districts in general purpose
aid to education (GPA).
Based on that allocation, the state then calculates a
statewide property tax “mil rate expectation” that
will raise sufficient additional funds to fully support
“essential programs and services” (EPS) at all of
Maine’s public schools. When more state resources
are allocated to school funding, the statewide mil

K–

20%

$60

Percentage of Households

80%

>$

Percentage of Households

30%

View current & previous issues of MPR at: digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mpr/

MAINE TAX REFORM
Figure 5:

State Expenditures Related to Property Taxes
($ millions, inflation-adjusted)

rate expectation is reduced,
thereby lowering property taxes.
$1,200
A similar substitution of
state funds for local funds occurs
$1,000
when the state allocates money
for municipal revenue sharing.
$800
Given a fixed local budget, more
municipal revenue sharing translates into less being required from
$600
local property taxes. Of course,
the dollars spent by the state on
$400
school funding and municipal
revenue sharing need not all
$200
translate into property tax relief.
It may also allow municipalities
$0
and school districts to spend
1996
1998
more than they otherwise would.
There is no broad consensus
on the extent to which incremental funding for these
programs lowers property taxes, as compared with
increasing local spending.
The stated aim of state government is to distribute
5 percent of its revenues to municipalities in the form
of municipal revenue sharing and to support 55
percent of the EPS cost of K-12 education. In practice,
however, budgetary pressures and other legislative
priorities have reduced these allocations. Figure 5
shows real spending by the state on the circuit breaker
program, homestead exemption, revenue sharing, and
general purpose aid to education, respectively, for fiscal
years 1996 through the recently approved 2014 and
2015 budgets. (The historical amounts are inflationadjusted to fiscal year 2013 dollars.)
Figure 5 shows an increase in inflation-adjusted
state spending for these purposes from 1996 to 2008,
particularly following the enactment of LD 1 in 2005,
and then a pronounced drop in funding precipitated by
economic conditions and other factors since 2008. (It is
worth noting that school enrollment has also declined
over this period, from about 214,000 public school
students in 1996 to about 185,000 today.) The article by
Shaw (this issue) provides further discussion about the
changes in revenue sharing and school funding, and the
municipal responses to these state revenue changes.
Who Benefits from Each Approach?
Throughout this discussion is an implicit trade-off
between the depth and breadth of property tax relief
associated with different funding measures. The circuit

Circuit Breaker
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Revenue Sharing
School Funding (GPA)

2000
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breaker program is the most narrowly targeted, benefiting resident homeowners with high property tax
burdens and resident renters with high housing cost
burdens. The homestead exemption is the next most
targeted, benefiting resident homeowners only, and
with larger proportionate benefits to those with less
valuable homes and to those with higher property tax
rates already.
Incrementally increasing municipal revenue sharing
or school funding are broader forms of property tax
relief, but their impact across communities is uneven.
Within any community, their effect is to reduce the
property tax mil rate across the board for all property tax
payers, whether resident or nonresident, primary home
or vacation home, residential or commercial. The relief
is proportional to what taxpayers pay already. Comparing
across communities, however, there are distinct differences between the effects on property taxes of revenue
sharing and school-funding support.
For most communities throughout Maine, an
increase in general purpose aid to education lowers the
EPS mil rate expectation by the same amount—about
0.1 mil per $10 million in incremental state funding—
regardless of the existing property tax rate in each
community. The exceptions are those communities in
Maine, referred to as “minimum receivers,” that have
enough property value to raise the full cost of EPS with
a tax rate lower than the mil rate expectation. These
communities benefit little or not at all from an increase
in state funding for education. Though they are a
minority of communities in the state, a disproportionate
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number of Maine’s vacation properties are located in
minimum receiver communities.
Municipal revenue sharing is allocated across
communities using a different formula, where communities with higher property tax mill rates receive larger
allocations. Thus, higher-mil-rate communities, including
so-called service center communities, are more explicitly
targeted. The municipal revenue sharing formula works
in a continuous way—the higher the mil rate, the greater
the relief provided. The school-funding formula has more
of a kink in the formula, where communities on one side
of the kink (the minimum receivers) get virtually nothing,
whereas communities above the kink (those paying the
EPS mil rate expectation) get essentially the same mil rate
relief, regardless of overall tax rate.
Illustrative Effects of State-Funded
Property Tax Relief

To further illustrate these implications, I estimate
the impact on property taxes of allocating an additional
$50 million in state resources to four alternative property tax relief measures. The first approach would add
$50 million to general purpose aid to education, raising
the allocation from $947 million to $997 million, and
bringing Maine closer to its stated goal of 55 percent.
The effect of this reform is to lower the statewide mil rate
expectation for K-12 education from 7.86 mils to about
Figure 6:

Impact of $50 Million in Property Tax Relief
(Residents)
School Funding

Municipal Revenue Sharing

Homestead Exemption

Property Tax Relief

$300

$200

$100

$0
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7.34 mils, or by about 0.52 mils in most Maine communities. The property tax savings would be about $50 on
a $100,000 home, $100 on a $200,000 home, and $500
on a $1 million home. There would be no property tax
savings in minimum receiver communities.
The second approach would add $50 million to
municipal revenue sharing, raising the allocation from
$65 million to $115 million, and approaching the stated
public policy goal of 5 percent. The effect of this policy
is to lower the mil rate for all taxpayers throughout the
state, but more significantly in communities with higher
property tax mil rates already. For example, the 50,000
resident homeowners paying the highest property tax
rates would see an average reduction of about 0.96 mils,
from 20.61 to 19.65, translating to about $100 in property tax savings on a $100,000 home, $200 on a
$200,000 home, and $1,000 on a $1 million home. The
50,000 resident homeowners paying the lowest property
tax rates in the state would see an average mil rate reduction of 0.14 mills, from 9.16 to 9.02, or about $15 in
property tax savings on a $100,000 home, $30 on a
$200,000 home, and $150 on a $1 million home.
The third approach uses the $50 million to increase
the homestead exemption from the current level of
$10,000 to $30,000. Because municipalities are reimbursed for only half of the lost tax base, this results in an
average increase in mil rate of 0.31, from 13.32 to 13.63.
This draws a modestly increased property tax share
from nonresident and commercial taxpayers. For
all but the most valuable homestead properties,
the increase in the exempt amount far outweighs
the increase in rate. The property tax savings in an
“average” community, therefore, would be about
$250 on a $100,000 home, $210 on a $200,000
home, and no savings on a $1 million home.
The fourth approach uses the $50 million to
restore the circuit breaker benefit formula enacted
in LD 1 in 2005. The effect of this policy varies
with the individual circumstances of the property
owner or renter. For those without a high burden
of property taxes (or rent), there would be no property tax savings from the increased funding. For
those with the greatest burden of property taxes (or
rent), savings are as much as $2,000 per household.
To further analyze these impacts, I consider
three illustrative homesteads and three illustrative
nonresident properties, shown in Figures 6 and 7,
respectively. (The circuit breaker is not included in
these illustrations because its effect—though the
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Figure 7:

Property Tax Relief

largest of all for residents with high property tax
burden—cannot be generalized across properties
in the same way.)
In Figure 6, the Waterville residence is
illustrative of a modest home in a high-tax-rate
community. The Portland residence is illustrative
of a typical home in Maine’s largest city. The
Scarborough residence is a higher-valued home in
a coastal community. Because the homestead
exemption benefits high-mil-rate communities
and lower-valued properties more, its biggest
impact is in the Waterville and Portland illustration. The more valuable Scarborough home benefits most from the lower-mil-rate expectation
created by increased school funding.
The nonresident and commercial illustrations in Figure 7 are also instructive. For example,
the first illustration is for the same $600,000
Scarborough home included in Figure 6, but
owned by a nonresident rather than a resident. The
nonresident receives essentially the same property tax
relief from additional school funding as the resident,
and the same property tax relief from additional
revenue sharing as the resident. The homestead exemption, however, increases taxes on the nonresident and
commercial taxpayers, while decreasing them on the
resident.
Figure 7 also compares two identical homes in
Scarborough and Camden owned by nonresidents. The
effects of an increase in revenue sharing or the homestead exemption are comparable across these properties.
The effects of school funding, however, are dramatically
different. Scarborough is subject to the statewide EPS
mil rate expectation, which declines with additional
school funding, thereby lowering property taxes.
Camden, on the other hand, is a minimum receiver, able
to support EPS costs at a mil rate that is already lower
than the statewide rate. Therefore, additional school
funding has no impact in Camden. Camden is illustrative of the most highly valued recreational areas of
Maine’s coast, lakefront, and mountains where a lot of
Maine’s vacation properties are concentrated.
INCOME TAX REFORM

T

hree issues have dominated discussions of Maine’s
income taxes. The first is the top tax rate. Because it
is higher than most states, it may discourage some individuals and businesses from locating in Maine, thereby

Impact of $50 Million in Property Tax Relief
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dampening Maine’s economic performance. The magnitude of this effect, however, is a subject of considerable
controversy. The second issue is the progressivity of
the income tax, particularly in conjunction with other
taxes that burden lower-income households disproportionately. The income tax formula can be calibrated to
achieve nearly any progressivity objective. The third
issue is the cost of Maine’s many tax exemptions, deductions, credits, and reimbursements that have been incorporated in the system over time. Although each advances
some public purpose, they also reduce revenues or
require higher tax rates to maintain the same revenues.
Maine’s new income tax formula has tax rates of 6.5
percent and 7.95 percent. Table 1 shows the total income
ranges in which a “typical” taxpayer is subject to these
marginal tax rates in 2013, assuming they use the standard
deduction and earn all income from nonexempt sources.
Those concerned with the competitiveness of
Maine’s income tax structure focus on both the 7.95
percent rate and the moderate income level at which
that rate is imposed. Figure 8 compares Maine’s 7.95
percent tax rate with the highest rates used in other
states, using tax information compiled by the Federation
of Tax Administrators for 2013. The figure shows that
the 7.95 percent top marginal tax rate in Maine is the
ninth highest among the 50 states. The median state has
a top marginal income tax rate of 6 percent. Among the
states with the highest marginal income tax rates (above
8 percent), New York imposes its highest rate only on
individual taxable income above $1 million; California
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Figure 8:

Highest Income Tax Rates by State, 2013
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Table 1:

Total Income Threshold for Each Income
Tax Rate in Maine, 2013

Tax Rate

Individual

Married
Couple

Four-Person
Family

No Tax

<$15,200

<$28,400

<$36,200

6.5% Rate

$15,200–$30,900

$28,400–$59,800

$36,200–$67,600

7.95% Rate

>$30,900

>$59,800

>$67,600

Source: Maine Revenue Services

and New Jersey, above $500,000; Vermont, above
$388,350; Washington, DC, above $350,000; Hawaii,
above $200,000; Oregon, above $125,000; and Iowa,
above $67,230. By contrast, Maine imposes its highest
rate on more modest incomes.
Approaches to Reform
Proposals for income tax reform in Maine have
encompassed two distinct approaches and multiple
18
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specifics. The first would retain the basic structure of the
state’s current income tax, which parallels the federal tax
system to a significant extent. That is, the state income
tax features a progressive rate structure, personal exemptions for filers and dependents, and a choice of standard
or itemized deductions. This traditional approach to tax
reform involves reducing income tax obligations within
the existing framework, such as by adjusting tax rates or
tax brackets. This was the approach used in 2011, when
the legislature enacted an income tax reduction that
took effect in 2013. The reform increased the level of
income one needs to earn before being subject to any tax
and replaced the four marginal tax rates that existed
previously (2.0 percent, 4.5 percent, 7.0 percent, and
8.5 percent) with the current two-rate system of 6.5
percent and 7.95 percent. Figure 9 shows the impact of
the reform on taxpayers at different income levels, illustrated by the total tax rate paid by a four-person family
using the standard deduction under the old and new
systems, respectively.
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Figure 9:

Income Tax Reform Taking Effect in 2013
(total tax rate for a four-person family using
the standard deduction)
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In the current legislative session, a
bipartisan group in which I participated
presented versions of a more comprehen6%
sive income tax reform plan that illustrates
this second approach. The so-called gang5%
of-eleven plan dropped the top income tax
rate by as much as half, eliminated many
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designed to offset the disproportionate
burden of sales taxes on lower-income
-2%
$80K
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$160K
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$60K
$100K
$140K
$180K
$0
resident households. The negative tax
rates at the left of Figure 10 correspond to
these refundable tax credits. Depending
on the calibration of the plan formulas, the integrated
system, for example, the top tax rate of 7.95 percent is a
system could moderate, or even eliminate, the overall
highly visible component feature of Maine’s system and
regressivity of sales taxes and reestablish progressivity
likely deters some individuals and businesses from
within a flat-rate income tax structure.
locating in Maine. An important insight in designing
What are the relative merits of the traditional prothe flat-rate alternative systems is that nobody actually
gressive rate structure versus the more innovative flat tax
pays a full 7.95 percent of their income in taxes, after
with a progressive credit? One clear difference is the
accounting for personal exemptions, standard or itemvisibility of the top “published” tax rate. In the current
ized deductions, and the portions of income that are
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taxed at a lower rate. A four-person family with income
of $200,000 and itemized deductions of $30,000, for
example, now pays about $10,989, or 5.5 percent of its
income, in Maine income taxes. The family’s average tax
rate of 5.5 percent is much lower than its marginal tax
rate of 7.95 percent. A flat tax with a phased-out credit
allows the published top tax rate in Maine to reflect the
highest average rate, rather than the highest marginal
rate. The extent to which economic activity is driven
primarily by the published tax rate, the average tax rate
or the marginal tax rate, is a subject for another study.
SALES TAX REFORM

M

aine imposes a 5 percent general sales tax (temporarily increased to 5.5 percent), a 7 percent tax on
prepared meals and lodging (temporarily increased to
8 percent), a 10 percent tax on rental cars, and a 0.44
percent tax on real estate transfers. Maine also imposes

an excise tax on cigarettes at $2.00 per pack, beer and
hard cider at $0.35 per gallon, wine at $0.60 per gallon,
and sparkling wine and low-alcohol spirits at $1.24 per
gallon. (Those rates include both the base tax rate and a
supplementary premium tax.)
Two issues have motivated interest in reforming
sales and excise taxes. First, sales and excise taxes have
been suggested as the area where the state could increase
revenues to offset lower income and property taxes.
Although income and property taxes are generally
considered high in Maine, sales taxes are considered at
or below the average of states. Thus, sales and excise tax
reform is usually advanced as part of an umbrella of
reforms that aim to rebalance Maine’s tax system more
comprehensively. Figure 11 compares the sales tax rate
across states, based on summary data from the Federation
of Tax Administrators.
At the temporarily raised rate of 5.5 percent, Maine
is near the median of states. It is worth noting that

Figure 11: Sales Tax Rates by State
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Figure 12: Number of Services Taxed by State
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roughly half of states allow local sales taxes on top of the
statewide rates. If we include these additional local rates
in the comparison, Maine’s rate might be considered
that much lower by comparison.
The second issue motivating discussions of sales tax
reform involves the appropriate breadth of the sales tax
base, and particularly its exclusion of most services. As
the composition of consumer purchases has evolved over
time to include more services, advocates of reform
contend that the sales tax base should also expand.
Advocates of sales and excise tax reform also emphasize
the volatility of revenues that results from a narrower tax
base. For example, roughly a third of sales tax revenues
are attributable to sales of automobiles and construction
materials, both of which are highly cyclical industries.
Comparing the sales tax base across states is more
complicated, as the definitions of product and service
categories that may be subject to tax can differ considerably. The Federation of Tax Administrators, however,
conducts a periodic survey of states on 168 potentially

taxable services (FTA 2008). The services included in
the survey are not intended to be comprehensive or
complete. Nevertheless, they give some sense of the
scope of services that may be taxed and of the broad
variation among states in the number of such services
taxed. Based on data from the last survey in 2007,
Figure 12 illustrates the variation across states in the
number of service categories taxed in different states.
Based on this measure, Maine appears to have a sales tax
base that is narrower than that of most states, taxing 25
of the categories in the survey, compared with 55 at the
median (among states with a sales tax), and up to 160 at
the extreme.
Sales tax reform proposals include both rate
changes and changes to the sales that are subject to tax.
The simplest reforms would raise one or more sales or
excise tax rates. For example, increases in the cigarette
tax and/or the lodging tax are proposed in nearly every
legislative session. More complicated reform proposals
would expand the base of the sales tax, most commonly
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Illustrative Services in 2007 FTA Survey: Services Taxed in at Least 10 States but Not Taxed in Maine
Admissions & Amusements
Admission to professional sports events
Amusement park admission & rides
Circuses and fairs—admission & games
Admission to cultural events
Pari-mutuel racing events.
Billiard parlors
Bowling alleys
Membership fees in private clubs.
Admission to school &
college sports events
Pinball & other mechanical amusements
Coin operated video games

37
36
34
31
29
27
27
23
22
19
17

Agricultural Services
Landscaping services (including lawn care) 21
Pet grooming
18
Automotive Services
Auto service. except repairs,
including painting & lube
Automotive rustproofing & undercoating
Automotive washing & waxing
Parking lots & garages
Automotive road service
and towing services
Business Services
Commercial linen supply
Tire recapping & repairing
Exterminating (includes termite services)
Telephone answering service
Maintenance & janitorial services
Window cleaning
Security services
Armored car services
Private investigation (detective) services
Credit information, credit bureaus
Employment agencies
Packing & crating
Interior design & decorating
Temporary help agencies
Computer
Software—modifications
to canned program
Software—custom programs—material
1 Maine

22

25
25
21
21
19

33
28
21
20
19
19
18
16
16
13
11
11
10
10

29
24

Computer (continued)
Software—custom programs—
professional serv.
Information services
Internet Service Providers-DSL
or other broadband
Mainframe computer access
& processing serv.
Construction
Carpentry, painting, plumbing & similar
trades
Gross Income of Construction Contractors
Construction service (grading,
excavating, etc.)
Water well drilling

14
13
12
11

13
12
12
10

Fabrication, Installation and Repair Services
Service contracts sold at the time of sale
32
of TPP
Repair labor, generally
24
Labor on radio/TV repairs; other electronic
24
equipment
Labor charges—repairs other tangible
24
property
Installation charges by persons selling
23
property
Labor charges on repairs to motor vehicles 21
Labor charges—repairs to intrastate
20
vessels
Installation charges—other than seller
18
of goods
Labor charges on repair of aircraft
16
Labor—repairs to commercial
15
fishing vessels
Labor—repairs or remodeling
15
of real property
Custom meat slaughtering, cutting
14
& wrapping
Labor charges—repairs to interstate
11
vessels
Labor charges on repairs to railroad
11
rolling stock
Leases and Rentals1
Personal property, short term (generally)
Personal property, long term (generally)
Bulldozers, draglines & const. mach
Rental of hand tools to licensed
contractors

45
45
45
45

Leases and Rentals1 (contd.)
Aircraft rental to individual pilots,
40
short term
Aircraft rental to individual pilots, long term 39
Limousine service (with driver)
16
Personal Services
Tuxedo rental
Diaper service
Health clubs, tanning parlors, reducing
salons
Laundry and dry cleaning services,
non-coin op
Gift and package wrapping service
Garment services (altering & repairing)
Shoe repair
Carpet and upholstery cleaning
Swimming pool cleaning & maintenance
Income from funeral services
Water softening & conditioning
Fishing & hunting guide services
Massage services
Storage
Automotive storage
Marina Service (docking, storage,
cleaning, repair)
Fur storage
Mini-storage
Household goods storage
Cold storage
Food storage
Packing & crating
Transportation Services
Income from intrastate transportation
of persons
Utility Service
Interstate telephone & telegraph, ind.
Interstate telephone & telegraph, res.
Other fuel (including heating oil), res.
Natural gas, residential
Sewer and refuse, industrial
Water, residential
Sewer and refuse, residential

38
23
22
22
21
20
20
19
17
13
13
11
11

19
17
16
14
13
13
10
10

11

27
27
23
22
15
12
11

generally taxes the leasor on the original purchase, but not the consumer leasing the property.
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Figure 13: Share of Housing Units that Are Vacation Homes by State, 2010
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to consumer services. Examples are recreational
services such as golf, skiing, movies, amusement parks,
or concerts; repair services such as for cars, lawn
mowers, or appliances; personal property services such
as dry cleaning, rug cleaning, car washing, picture
framing, or storage; or personal care services such as
hair cutting, beauty salons, and massage. The sidebar
lists some of the services that the 2007 FTA survey
reports as taxed in at least 10 states, but that are not
taxed in Maine.
The extent to which Maine could or should expand
its sales tax base is a question of considerable political
and substantive controversy. No industry now exempt
from sales tax wants to lose that exemption. Other
policy considerations are avoiding pyramiding (taxing
both the inputs to production and the final product);
the mobility of business activity across state lines by
buyers or providers attempting to avoid the tax (such as
those providing professional services); and the potential

regressivity of taxing necessities (such as groceries and
household utilities).
TAX REFORM AND EXPORTING

A

s noted in the introduction, there is a large nonresident presence in Maine. Maine’s nonresident population includes at least three categories of people living
part of the year in Maine. First, there are the nonresident owners of second homes in Maine’s ocean, lake,
and mountain communities. U.S. Census data show
that Maine has by far the highest percentage of second
homes of any state in the country—more than 118,000
vacation homes—many of which are owned and used
for extended periods by nonresident families (see Figure
13). Second, Maine is a highly visited vacation state,
symbolized by its “vacationland” motto. The Maine
Office of Tourism estimates that there are nearly 15
million nonresident vacation visitors to Maine annually,
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averaging 3.7 nights per visit (Maine Office of Tourism
2013). Third, at least anecdotally, there appear to be
sizable numbers of nonresident retirees in Maine, some
of whom spend as much as five or six months per year
in the state.
The importance of residence to tax policy is best
illustrated by two identical retirees, each of whom
spends six months in Maine and six months in Florida.
One of them remains a Maine resident, but spends an
extended period of winter in Florida. The other carefully
documents their presence in the two states to be classified for tax purposes as a Florida resident. When in
Maine, both retirees look much the same, driving on
Maine roads, using Maine’s hospitals as needed, and
enjoying Maine’s communities, environment, and
quality of life. One of them is subject to the full weight
of Maine’s 7.95 percent income tax. The other is fully
exempt from all state income taxes. While Maine cannot
impose income taxes on these nonresident retirees, it
could draw more revenues from the categories of taxes
that nonresidents do pay.

Although the exporting of tax
burden to nonresidents is viewed
favorably by many, … there are
offsetting implications that need to
be weighed against these benefits.
Put differently, the weighting of Maine’s income,
sales, and property taxes is important to how Maine’s
taxes are apportioned between residents and nonresidents. Nonresidents who spend time in Maine are generally exempt from state income taxes, often reside in
high-valuation regions with low property tax mil rates,
and devote a large portion of their spending in Maine to
purchases that are exempt from sales taxes. By taxing
consumption more universally and more heavily, proponents argue, the state can allocate the tax burden in
rough proportion to the amount of time people spend
in Maine (or the dollars they spend in Maine), rather
than whether they are defined as residents or nonresidents. The revenues from consumption taxes, which are
24
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imposed on both residents and nonresidents, can then
be directed to income tax and property tax relief that
benefits Maine residents almost exclusively.
Each of the comprehensive tax reform proposals of
the last decade—none of them successfully enacted—has
clearly emphasized the goal of exporting more of Maine’s
taxes to nonresidents. For example, LD 1925 in 2007
was a revenue neutral proposal, explicitly entitled “An Act
to Cut Taxes on Maine Residents by over $140,000,000.”
The pared-down version of tax reform introduced as LD
1088 in 2009, also revenue neutral, was entitled “An Act
to Modernize the Tax Laws and Provide over $75,000,000
to Residents of the State in Tax Relief.” Maine Revenue
Services estimated that the further pared-down tax
reform bill that was ultimately vetoed by citizen referendum in 2010, LD 1495 would reduce the tax burden
on Maine residents by about $50 million.
The recent gang-of-eleven reform plan proposed an
even larger shift away from income taxes and toward
sales and excise taxes than any of these earlier plans. It
also contained a proposal for a $50,000 homestead
exemption that would have provided additional property tax relief targeted at residents. Though the degree of
exporting in the plan was not estimated, the intent was
to raise about $700 million in additional annual revenues from sales and excise taxes (paid by residents and
nonresidents alike), while providing $700 million in
resident-targeted tax relief through Maine’s income and
property tax systems. It relied on both higher sales and
excise tax rates, and a substantial broadening of the sales
tax base to achieve these aims.
Although the exporting of tax burden to nonresidents is viewed favorably by many, and the reduced tax
burden on residents likely has a positive economic
impact, there are offsetting implications that need to be
weighed against these benefits. Specifically, to what
extent do higher taxes on nonresidents discourage them
from spending in Maine and how does this negative
economic impact compare with the positive impact of
lower taxes on residents? Many in the tourism industry,
for example, point to the potential of tourism-related
taxes (such as an increase in the lodging tax, or a new
sales tax on ski-lift tickets) to discourage out-of-state
visitors from spending time in Maine. Many in the real
estate industry make a similar claim with respect to
proposed increases in the real estate transfer tax. They
suggest that increasing that tax may discourage purchases
of second homes in Maine, or reduce the market value
of existing real estate investments.
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